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SECTION 106 OF THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET ENHANCEMENT ACT
OF 1984 AND THE NEED FOR OVERRIDING
STATE LEGISLATION
I. Introduction
On October 3, 1984, the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act (SMMEA) was signed into law.' Title I of this legislation was
designed to remove some of the regulatory barriers that previously
inhibited the development of a private market for mortgage-backed
securities. 2 Section 106 of Title I, which provided for federal reg-
ulation, preempted blue sky laws3 requiring registration of mortgage-
backed securities and regulatory statutes affecting investment in mort-
gage-backed securities by state-chartered financial institutions.4 Both
categories of regulation were perceived by Congress as posing major
'obstacles to participation by the private sector in the secondary
market for home mortgages.' Additionally, Congress included pro-
visions in section 106 which reserve a seven year period during which
the states may enact legislation overriding either or both of the
federal preemptions.
6
1. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, 98 Stat. 1689.
2. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2828-29. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text
for discussion of the regulatory changes effected by the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act.
3. See infra notes 184-212 and accompanying text for discussion of the blue
sky laws. Blue sky laws are state regulations governing securities. They obtained
their name from the deceptive practices they sought to eliminate-the selling of
"building lots in the blue sky in fee simple." 1lc H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, BLUE SKY REGULATION, Pt. 1, § 1.01 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as SOWARDS & HIRSCH].
4. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text for discussion of legal in-
vestment regulation.
5. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2808, 2814-15; H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834.
6. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
.440, § 106, 98 Stat. 1689. Section 106(b) provides that the states may reinstate or
establish new requirements to replace the federal preemption of state legal investment
legislation. Id. at 1692. Similarly, section 106(c) provides that any state may enact
a statute which overrides the federal preemption of its blue sky laws requiring
registration of private mortgage-backed securities (PMBS). Id. In both instances,
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This Note examines whether the states should enact legislation to
override the federal preemptions. Initially, this Note provides an
overview of the secondary market for home mortgages 7 by examining
the factors leading to the enactment of SMMEA.8 It then examines
the scope and rationale behind the section 106 preemptions. 9 While
it was believed the situation required preemption of state laws, the
existence of the override provisions indicates that Congress felt that
the states should be given an opportunity to reevaluate their laws. 10
Finally, this Note juxtaposes the policies and objectives underlying
state legal investment and blue sky laws with the section 106 preemp-
tions." Based on that analysis, this Note concludes that the enactment
of override legislation is required to protect potential mortgage-
backed security investors from fraud and from speculative securities
and to preserve the fiscal welfare of state-chartered financial insti-
tutions. 12
I. Overview of the Secondary Market for Residential Mortgages
Traditionally, thrift institutions 3 were the primary source of long
term credit for residential mortgages. 4 Serving as financial inter-
the state statute must specifically refer to the federal preemption in order to be
effective. Id. Moreover, in the case of a state statute overriding the preemption
of legal investment laws, it may not affect the validity of any contractual commitment
to purchase, hold or invest that was made prior to the enactment of the state
statute, and such statute may not require the sale or other disposition of any
securities acquired prior to the enactment of the overriding state statute. Id.
7. See infra notes 13-81 and accompanying text for an overview of the secondary
market for home mortgages. Briefly, the secondary market is a network of mortgage
lenders who sell the loans they have originated to investors in the form of securities
backed by groups of loans. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA 553 (1984).
8. See infra notes 13-89 and accompanying text for discussion of the factors
which led to the enactment of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act.
9. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
the § 106(a) preemption of legal investment laws. See infra notes 179-83 and
accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the § 106(c) preemption of blue
sky laws.
10. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834.
11. See infra notes 91-177 and accompanying text for a legal investment analysis.
See infra notes 184-212 and accompanying text for a blue sky analysis.
12. See infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed
state legislation overriding the § 106 preemptions.
13. A thrift institution is a non-bank depositary institution such as a savings
and loan association, mutual savings bank or credit union. P. HORVITZ & R.
WARD, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 105-13 (5th ed. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as HORVITZ & WARD].
14. Brick, A Primer on Mortgage-Backed Securities, 167 THE BANKER'S MAG-
AZINE Jan.-Feb., at 44 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brick]. The past success of thrifts
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mediaries,15 thrifts thrived on the spread between long-term interest
rates earned on mortgages, which they originated and kept in their
portfolios, and short-term rates paid to depositors. 6 Recently, how-
ever, the demand for new mortgages has outpaced the limited re-
sources of the thrift industry. 7 In addition, the late 1970's saw
thrifts undergo a severe crisis due to the deregulation of interest
rate ceilings on short-term deposits and unusually high short-term
rates. 8 These developments made it unprofitable for thrifts to con-
tinue to offer long-term, fixed-rate residential mortgages to home-
buyers in the absence of a market where such loans could be
liquidated immediately. 9 Moreover, they underscored the importance
in the residential mortgage market can be attributed to their comparative advantage
over other mortgage lenders, as well as the legal restrictions to which such institutions
are subjected. The advantage held by thrifts over other lenders is that they are
essentially local institutions. T. MAYER, J. DUESENBERRY & R. ALIBER, MONEY,
BANKING & THE ECONOMY 106 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MAYER, DUESENBERRY
& ALIBER]. This enables their personnel to keep abreast of changes in the local
real estate market and thus provide a more customized service for their clients.
With respect to the legal restrictions, legal investment laws have traditionally limited
the type of investments thrifts can make to real estate, U.S. government securities
and cash. Id.
15. Financial intermediaries, in addition to clearing payments, obtain the funds
of savers in exchange for their own liabilities (such as entries in a passbook), in
order to make loans to others. Id. at 106; see also HORVITZ & WARD, supra note
13, at 15-18.
16. Older, Issuers of MBS Enhanced by Reforms, The Bond Buyer, Oct. 4,
1984, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Older].
17. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2809, 2810.
18. See E. BOWDEN & J. HOLBERT, REVOLUTION IN BANKING 57-94 (2d ed.
1984) for a discussion of the effects of deregulation of the banking system.
Deregulation of interest rate ceilings brought about the end to a longstanding
advantage that thrifts enjoyed over commercial banks in terms of the amount of
interest such institutions could offer to depositors. Consequently, the ensuing com-
petition among financial institutions to attract depositors greatly increased the cost
of such funds. The thrift industry was particularly disadvantaged by the large
percentage of its assets that were tied up in long-term fixed-rate residential mortgages
at rates substantially below the cost of new funds. Id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2827, 2828-29; N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, § 3 (Bus.), at 1,
col 1. The significance of the mortgage-backed security (MBS) market is that it
enables mortgage lenders to convert debt instrumemts into fungible and highly
marketable investment assets. This reduces the risk of long-term lending and
ultimately, the cost of credit to the consumer. Moreover, the lender may prefer
to liquidate even the higher yielding loans in his portfolio because the origination
fees which he receives under contract may be more attractive than speculative profits
from any future interest rate spread. Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives
in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 427
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Lance].
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of securing alternative sources of capital to fuel the increasing demand
for residential mortgage credit.20 The result has been the emergence
of a strong secondary market for residential mortgages.2'
By definition, "[tihe secondary mortgage market for home mort-
gages is a network of primary mortgage lenders who sell loans they
have originated, and investors who buy loans or securities backed
by groups of loans." 22 The dual goals of the secondary market are
to equalize credit availability throughout the country,23 and, more
importantly, to provide a link between the capital and mortgage
markets through sales of mortgages in the form of securities that
attract nontraditional mortgage investors.2 4
The mortgage-backed security, the financial instrument created by
the secondary market to lure capital to the housing market, is an
undivided interest in a collateralized pool of mortgage loans.25 A
mortgage-backed security is created when a mortgage lender sells
his mortgages to a pool sponsor 26 who assigns them to a
20. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2808, 2815; Brownstein & Lore, Public, Private Sector Focus on
Secondary Mortgages, Legal Times, Sept. 26, 1983, at 14, col. 1 [hereinafter cited
as Brownstein & Lore].
21. See Kanner, The Secondary Market for Mortgages, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 344
(1982) (overview of evolution of secondary market for mortgages) [hereinafter cited
as Kanner]; Rise of a National Mortgage Market, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, §
3 (Bus.), at 1 col. 1 (overview of emerging national mortgage market); Brownstein
& Lore, supra note 21, at 14 (overview of emerging national mortgage market).
22. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 7, at 553.
23. Id. The original objective of the secondary market was "to redistribute the
available mortgage money by transferring funds from the capital-surplus to capital-
deficit areas, . . . The secondary market accomplished this role through its purchases
of mortgages in the newer, faster-growing regions of the country [such as the south
and southwest] and sales of mortgages in the older, slower regions [such as the
northeast]." Id.
24. Id. In the past, financial institutions such as life insurance companies avoided
direct investment in residential mortgages. Brick, supra note 14, at 44. There were
three major reasons for their lack of participation: (1) the administrative costs of
investing in mortgages is high due to the cumbersome nature of the instrument;
(2) the administrative costs in relation to the return on the investment are dispro-
portionately high compared to other investments like corporate bonds; and (3) large
institutuions are not easily accessible to the mortgage market because they are
highly centralized: Id. at 44-45.
25. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 2.02[71[d]
(Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MADISON & DWYER]; Brick, supra note 14, at
45; Lance supra note 19, at 427.
26. A sponsor serves as a conduit between mortgage lenders and investors. The
sponsor assembles pools of mortgage loans that it purchases from lenders and
packages them in the form of securities which are sold to investors. The PMBS market
has grown to such proportions that a number of conduit firms have been established
whose activities consist solely of sponsoring PMBS offerings. Marcis, More Thrift
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trustee.27 Certificates28 are sold to investors who ultimately receive
payments generated by the mortgage pool. 29 The originating lender,3 0
who continues to service the underlying mortgages in the pool,'collec'ts
monthly payments and prepayments and, after deducting a service
fee, forwards the proceeds to the trustee who disburses them to all
certificate holders.
31
In addition to this "pass-through" security 3 2 the secondary market
has initiated the use of the mortgage-backed bond33 and the mortgage
pay-through bond.3 4 In contrast to the pass-through, which constitutes
a sale of the issuer's assets, 35 the mortgage-backed bond is a general
Institutions Move into Pass-Through Securities, 11 REAL EST. REV. 109, 111 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Marcis]; Brick, supra note 14, at 45.
27. A trustee's responsibilities include retaining the actual mortgage documents
and overseeing the collection and disbursement of monthly principal and interest
payments. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
28. A "pass-through" certificate evidences the-holder's direct ownership of the
mortgages in a pool of loans. Marcis, The Conventional Pass-Through Security:
A Star is Born, 9 REAL EST. REV. 59, 61 (1979); Brick, supra note 14, at 45.
29. Id.
30. In a single-lender issue, the mortgages in a pool are purchased from one
lender. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d]'. In a multi-lender issue,
the mortgages in the pool are purchased from more than one originating lender.
Id.
31. Id. Brick, supra note 14, at 45. The fact 'that a "pass-through" entitles a
certificate holder to his pro-rata share of all principal, interest and prepayments
on the underlying mortgages in the pool is particularly troublesome to the investor
who is concerned with predictability in terms of when and in what amounts his
payments will be received. In response to this pitfall,' the market has developed
what is known as a "fully modified pass-through" which guarantees a certificate
holder a specific rate of return that is predetermined at the time of the original
sale. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d]. Also available is the "partially
modified pass-through" which constitutes a partial guarantee of a specific rate of
return. Id.
32. Marcis, supra note 28, at 60 (instrument called "pass-through" because
mortgage payments are passed through to certificate holders). See supra notes 25-'
31 and accompanying text for discussion of'the structure and mechanics of the
"pass-through" security.
33. A mortgage-backed bond (MBB) is a debt obligation of the mortgage lender
that is collateralized by mortgage loans. Brick, supra note 14, at 48. The issuer
retains ownership of the loans and must rely upon the market value of the collateral
to meet its debt service requirements, rather than on the collateral cash flow.
MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d]; Adams, The Thrifts Seek Capital
With Mortgage-Backed Bonds, 6 REAL EsT. REV. 38, 39 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Adams].
34. The mortgage pay-through bond (MPB) is a debt obligation of the lender,
collateralized by mortgage loans, but its debt service requirements are met with
the collateral's cash flow. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d]; Brick,
supra note 14, at 49.35. Marcis, supra note 26, at 61 (sale of pass-throughs appears on issuer's
balance sheet as reduction in mortgages and increase in cash).
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debt obligation of the issuer collateralized by a pool of mortgages
or other mortgage-backed securities.3 6 The mortgage-backed bond
resembles a corporate bond in that it pays semi-annual interest and
carries specific maturity dates.37 The mortgage pay-through bond is
similar to a pass-through bond in that its debt service requirements
are met by the cash flow paid through to investors out of the pledged
mortgage collateral." Like the mortgage-backed bond, however, the
mortgage pay-through bond is a debt obligation of the issuer, not
a sale of assets.3 9 While the structure of the mortgage-backed bond
and the mortgage pay-through bond are distinct from that of the
pass-through certificate, their role in the secondary market is iden-
tical.40
The secondary market for home mortgages is dominated by three
government-sponsored agencies: 41 the Government National Mortgage
36. Because the MBB is reflected as indebtedness on the issuer's balance sheet,
the financial strength of the issuer and the quality and quantity of the collateral
are important from an investor's perspective. Typically, an issuer will be required
to maintain a minimum collateral value, for example 150% of the outstanding
principal on the bonds. Brick, supra note 14, at 48. Consequently, the issuer must
also replace any prepaid or foreclosed mortgage loans to maintain the required
collateral value. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d].
37. Adams, supra note 33, at 39. The MBB is unlike the corporate bond,
however, in that it is secured by a pledge of mortgage assets whereas the corporate
bond generally is secured by a pledge of any of a number of different types of
corporate property, such as inventory or accounts receivable, as well as real property.
GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 163-223 (4th ed. 1962).
38. Brick, supra note 14, at 49.
39. Id. The important distinction between the mortgage pay-through bond and
the pass-through is that the issuer need not sell his low yielding mortgages at a
capital loss. Rather, such loans can be used to form part of the MPB pool provided
that the extra risk is offset with additional collateral or mortgage insurance. Id.
at 51.
The popular collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a form of MPB. Id.
at 50. A typical CMO offering is divided into three classes. While each class of
bonds receives monthly interest payments based on the coupon rate, all monthly
principal payments are made to the class one bondholders until the face amount
of the bond is satisfied. Id. At such time, the class two bondholders begin to
receive mortgage principal payments and prepayments, and so on. Id. The offering
may be set up so that the class one bondholders are completely paid off after five
years; the class two bondholders, after twelve years; the class three bondholders,
after 20 years, CMO's reduce some of the uncertainty surrounding the actual term
of security. Id.
40. Kanner, supra note 21, at 348 (all mortgage related securities have proven
attractive to nontraditional mortgage investors).
41. Brownstein & Lore, supra note 20, at 14 (agencies created by Congress to
develop secondary market for residential mortgages to expand and equalize credit
on national basis by means of purchase and sale of whole mortgage loans).
[Vol. XIII
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Association (GNMA); 42 the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA); 43 and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC). 44 Combined, these agencies command more than ninety-
five percent of the market, with the remainder attributable to a few
private issuers. 45 GNMA, the largest participant in the secondary
market, is part of the Housing and Urban Development Department
(HUD) 46 and contributes to the secondary market through its guar-
antee of certificates supported by Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) insured and Veterans Administration (VA) guaranteed 47 mort-
42. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) was created by
Congress in 1968 under Title I of the National Housing Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(A)
(1968). It is a government corporation whose traditional role has been to support
the government's housing objectives by aiding that part of the housing market for
which conventional financing is not readily available. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 7, at 555. For a detailed discussion of GNMA's role in the secondary
market, see Ganis, All About the GNMA MBS Market, 4 REAL EST. REV. 55
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Ganis].
43. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was created by Congress
in 1943 as a government corporation and in 1954 it became a mixed ownership
entity. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, Title III, 48 Stat. 1246,
1252 (1934). In 1968, under Title III of the National Housing Act, FNMA was
partitioned into GNMA and FNMA and the latter was awarded to the private
shareholders. 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1968). FNMA also provides assistance to federal
housing programs through secondary market support. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 7, at 553. See generally Murray, Fannie Mae Goes Shopping for
Conventional Mortgages, 1 REAL EST. REV. 54 (1971) (discussion of evolution of
FNMA's role in secondary market).
44. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) was created by
Congress in 1970 under Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1451 (1970). FHLMC is owned by the Federal Home Loan Banks and its board
of directors is comprised of members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
serving in a separate capacity. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 7, at 553.
In addition to its secondary market activities, FHLMC is authorized to issue long-
term and short-term debt obligations and may access lines of credit. Id..
45. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2835. At the end of 1983, outstanding MBS's from the
three government agencies totaled $243 billion, the equivalent of 2076 of all out-
standing residential mortgage debt. Id. The private issuers, on the other hand,
accounted for only $10 billion of the currently outstanding MBS's. Id. Moreover,
it is estimated that approximately $72 billion in residential mortgages were financed
by securities in 1983. Id. at 2835-36. Of these, the government agencies accounted
for $70 billion, or 97%, while private issuers made up the remaining $2 billion.
Id.
46. See supra note 42.
47. The Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration are
federal agencies that provide mortgage insurance. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 11.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE,
NELSON & WHITMAN]. The Federal Housing Administration was established in 1934
by the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1701-42 (1934)) and currently is a part
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gages. 48 GNMA's guaranty, which is backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States for timely repayment of all principal and
interest,'9 effectively removes all risk of default.5 0
FHLMC and FNMA are both federally-chartered institutions."
FHLMC is owned by the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks52 and
purchases only conventional mortgages from thrifts that are members
of a Federal Home Loan Bank." FNMA is privately owned and
purchases both conventional and FHA insured and VA guaranteed
mortgages. 4 While both FNMA and FHLMC issue securities bearing
their own guarantees, unlike the GNMA certificates, they are not
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. 5 Nevertheless,
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. OSBORNE, NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra § 11.2. The Veterans Administration received its authority to
guarantee home loans for GIs in 1944 by the Serviceman's Readjustment Act (38
U.S.C. § 1801 (1944)). Id.
48. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 7, at 555. GNMA developed the
pass-through concept through its guarantee of mortgage pools composed exclusively
of government insured loans. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d].
The primary issuers of GNMA certificates are mortgage bankers and commercial
banks that originate FHA and VA mortgages for resale. Ganis, supra note 42, at
55.
49. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.0217][d]. GNMA's guarantee es-
sentially means that it can borrow from the U.S. treasury to meet its obligations.
Ganis, supra note 42, at 56-57.
50. MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, SPECIAL REPORT (on Mortgage-Backed
Securities) 10-11 (April 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT
REPORT].
51. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 7, at 553.
52. Id. at 553. The Federal Home Loan Banks are federally-chartered and
regulated banks that are established pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1421-1449 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
53. Older, supra note 16, at 5. The success of the GNMA pass-through program
prompted FHLMC to launch its own version in 1971, called the participation
certificate (PC). MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[71[d]. Like the GNMA
pass-through, the PC represents an interest in a pool of mortgages. Brick, supra note
14, at 46. The most significant difference between the two instruments is that the
mortgages in a FHLMC pool are not government backed. Id. Instead, they are
either insured by private mortgage insurance if their loan-to-value ratio exceeds
800o, or, if it does not, they are simply uninsured. Id. To compensate for the
lack of a government guarantee, a FHLMC pool typically contains a geographically
diverse group of loans and is considerably larger than a GNMA pool. Id.
54. THE MONEY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 7, at 553; Older, supra note 16, at
5. Based upon the success of the original GNMA pass-through concept, FNMA
embarked upon its own conventional pass-through program in 1981. MADISON &
DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d].
55. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.0217][d]. Although the essence of
the FNMA and FHLMC guarantees is that full repayment of principal and interest
are guaranteed, principal payments are only made as they are collected. Thus, there
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FNMA and FHLMC have benefitted substantially from their as-
sociation with the federal government in terms of market acceptance
5 6
regulatory exemptions, 7 and ability to raise funds for operations. 8
The private sector's participation in the secondary market, on the
other hand, is still in its infancy59 because private issuers have been
unable to compete with the government agencies due to tax, securities,
and investment regulations that were promulgated without mortgage-
backed securities in mind. 6° Moreover, since private mortgage-backed
securities are backed by pools of primarily conventional mortgages
and depend largely upon private insurance companies to indemnify
investors, they entail a higher level of risk than their federal agency
counterparts. 61
The secondary market for home mortgages already has wrought
enormous changes in the way housing is financed. 62 For example,
in 1983, $89 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities were issued, 63
accounting for roughly forty-seven percent of all home loans orig-
inated during the year. 64 Furthermore, it has been estimated that
$1.6 trillion will be needed to finance the demands for housing
credit over the next ten years, and more than $4 trillion will be
required to reach the end of the century. 65 In light of these astro-
nomical capital requirements, the federal agencies will be forced to
expand their current activities if they are to continue their dominant
role in the secondary market. 66 Even if the federal agencies assume
an enhanced secondary market role, they will not be able to satisfy
the credit demands of the future without help from the private
might be a delay in the event of a default by the mortgagor or, alternatively, in the
event of prepayments, the outstanding balance may be passed through ahead of
the expected maturity date. In any event, when such contingencies do occur, their
effect on the investor's monthly payment is usually minimal due to the large number
of loans in the pool. Brick, supra note 14, at 46.
56. Brownstein & Lore, supra note 20, at 14.
57. Older, supra note 16, at 5. The securities that are issued or guaranteed by
the three government-sponsored agencies are exempted securities under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78). Older, supra note 16, at 5.
58. Older, supra note 16, at 5.
59. Brownstein & Lore, supra note 20, at 14.
60. Id.
61. See MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 6, 10-11.
62. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2835.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 2837.
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sector.67 If the private sector does not begin to play a more active
role in the secondary market by attracting new investors and fresh
capital, there will be insufficient funds to fuel the burgeoning res-
idential mortgage market. 61
III. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act
The myriad concerns about the future of the housing industry
provided the impetus for the enactment of SMMEA. 69 The notion
behind SMMEA is that private mortgage-backed securities should
not be viewed as competing with government mortgage-backed se-
curities. Rather, they should be regulated as an investment vehicle
competing with other commonly pooled, privately sponsored in-
vestments such as mutual funds.70
SMMEA consists of two separate titles: Title I, "Securities Laws
Amendments," 71 and Title II, "Secondary Mortgage Market Pro-
grams. "72 Title II's amendments to the FNMA and FHLMC charters
grant new powers to each entity and attempt to clarify the role of
each in the secondary market. 3 Title I seeks "to increase the flow
67. Older, supra note 16, at 5.
68. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2836.
69. See id. at 7-8, 14-15; see S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2802, 2810-13.
70. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d]; Lance, supra note 19, at
426.71. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, tit. I, 98 Stat. 1689.
72. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
73. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 10-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2809, 2811-13, 2818-23. Congress believed that in order
to narrow the gap between government agencies and the private sector, a portion
of the market should be set aside for the latter. Id. To this end, Congress did
not expand FNMA's and FHLMC's authority to purchase mortgages above a
previously determined maximum value (which is presently $114,000, but is adjusted
annually). Id. Congress reasoned that the federal agencies were set up to assist
middle- and low-income homebuyers and, therefore, that these groups should con-
tinue to benefit from the agencies activities. Thus, the amendments effected by
Title II are intended to solidify the role of the federal agencies as secondary market
champions for governmental housing policies. Id.
Perhaps the most significant amendment to the FNMA and FHLMC charters is
the provision which allows the agencies to purchase second mortgages for both
single-family and multi-family properties. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-440, § 203, 98 Stat. 1689, 1693. With respect to the
second mortgages on one- to four- family residences, the Secondary Mortgage
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of funds to housing by facilitating participation by the private sector
in the secondary market for mortgages. ' 74 Thus, Title I contains
the more significant provisions in terms of removing some of the
regulatory barriers that previously impeded the development of a
private mortgage-backed security market. 7
Title I's provisions have the following effect on existing law: (1)
sections 102, 103, and 104 relax the margin requirements previously
imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 193476 to facilitate the
foward trading and delivery that occurs with mortgage securities; 77
Market Enhancement Act limits their value to one half of the limit on first lien
mortgages. Id. at 1694. Limitations are also placed on the value of second mortgages
on properties with five or more dwelling units which are purchased by the agencies:
Id.
Additionally, Title II contains provisions which: authorize FHLMC to purchase
manufactured-home loans on principal residences, regardless of whether they are
considered personal or real property under state law (§ 202); authorize FHLMC
to purchase loans insured by state agencies (§ 204); remove current loan-to-value ratios
imposed by both FHLMC and FNMA for one- to four-family residences (§ 205);
prohibit FHLMC from guaranteeing securities backed by mortgages not purchased
tby FHLMC (§ 210); increase the size of the FNMA board of directors from fifteen
to eighteen members, five of whom will be appointed annually by the President
.of the United States (§ 207); limit to forty-five days, with a fifteen-day extension,
the time within which the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development must
respond to FNMA requests for approval of corporate activities (§ 209). Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689,
1692-1698.
74. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2829.
75. See Id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2827,
2828-29; S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2808, 2812-14.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1981).
77. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, §§ 102, 103, 104, 98 Stat. 1689, 1690-91. The need to enhance the marginability
of PMBS's was due to the unique nature of the secondary mortgage market. The
secondary market typically requires a four- to six- month settlement period whereas
corporate securities are generally issued for only a one-week settlement. H.R. REP.
No. 994, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2827, 2829-31. The reason for this distinction in the case of the MBS is
that mortgages in a pool are not originated until a commitment to purchase the
securities that are backing them has been made. Since most rules regarding settlement
periods, extension of credit and broker-dealer relationships were developed with
an eye toward corporate-debt securities, and government MBS's are exempted from
such rules, an adjustment was needed to accomodate private MBS issuers. Thus,
§§ 102, 103, and 104 allow for the development of forward trading markets for
mortgage-related securities by amending §§ 7, 8(a) and l1(d)(1) of the Securities
.Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78h(a), 78k(d)(l)). Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, §§ 102-104, 98 Stat. 1689,
1690-91. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act provides that forward
trading of mortgage related securities for up to one hundred and eighty days does
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(2) section 105 removes restrictions on investment in private mortgage-
backed securities by federally-chartered depository institutions, sav-
ings and loan associations and credit unions previously subject to
regulatory limitations;78  and (3) section 106 preempts state legal
investment laws and blue sky laws which previously limited investment
in private mortgage-backed securities by state-chartered financial
institutions and required registration under the various state securities
statutes. 79 Additionally, section 101 amends the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to include a definition of the term "mortgage related
security." 80 Unless a mortgage-backed security qualifies under the
not constitute an extension of credit for purposes of these sections. H.R. REP.
No. 994, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2827, 2833-34. This relaxation of margin requirements is qualified by the
fact that the Federal Reserve Board may establish rules which limit or condition
the exception granted under the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act
when such rules would be in the best interest of investors or the general public.
Id.
78. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 105, 98 Stat. 1689, 1691.previously, federal savings and loan associations
had no explicit authority to purchase PMBS's and federal credit unions were simply
not permitted to invest in PMBS's at all. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2808, 2814. Because of the
need to attract new sources of credit to the housing industry, however, Congress
believed that these federally supervised financial institutions should have the authority
to invest in PMBS's. See id. Congress reasoned that such authority would pose
only limited risks to the financial welfare of federal savings and loan associations
and credit unions because it perceived PMBS's as not being inherently risky in-
vestments. See id. Moreover, Congress insured that the appropriate authorities
would be able to -provide regulations affecting the size and denomination of the
authorized purchases should they turn out to be necessary. Specifically, § 105(a)
of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act amends the Home Owners
Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1) (West 1980 & Supp.,1984)) to permit
federally chartered thrifts to invest in those PMBS's described in § 101 subject to
those conditions imposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689,
1691. Additionally, § 105(b) amends the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1757 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984)) in order to grant federal credit unions the same
authority to invest in PMBS's, as regulated by the National Credit Union Admin-
istration. See S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong.; 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2808, 2814; H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834.
79. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106, 98 Stat. 1689, 1691-92. For a discussion of the scope of and rationale
behind the § 106 preemptions, see infra notes 86-90, 179-83.
80. Secondary- Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 101, 98 Stat. 1689, 1689-90. A mortgage related security is a security which
is rated in one of the two highest categories by a nationally recognized statistical
rating organization. Such securities may include securities that are backed by first
lien mortgages on a single parcel of real estate, including stock allocated to residences
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section 101 definition, it is not eligible for the liberalized margin
requirements under sections 102, 103, and 104 or the preemptions
under section 106.81
Section 106, "The Preemption of State Law," is perhaps the most
heralded provision of Title I of SMMEA and, arguably, the most
important.12 While preemption is a drastic measure, Congress did
not employ it to prevent the states from providing investor protection
with respect to private mortgage-backed securities.13 Accordingly,
section 106 allows the states seven years in which to enact new
requirements which specifically override, limit or differ from the
federal preemptions.14 In effect, Congress has informed the states
that they should reexamine their blue sky and investment laws in
light of the new market for private mortgage-backed securities. 5
IV. The Section 106(a) Preemption and the
Need for Overriding Legislation
Section 106(a) preempts state legal investment laws to allow state-
chartered and regulated financial institutions, insurance companies,
pension funds, trustees, and other !regulated entities to invest in
mortgage related securities, exempt mortgage-backed securities or
securities issued or guaranteed by FNMA or FHLMC to the same
in a co-op in which is located a dwelling or mixed residential and commercial
structures, or a manufactured residence, and they cover a broad range of PMBS
instruments, such as intermediate securities, participations in other securities, and
CMO's. Id. Congress intended that this provision encourage the development of new
forms of MBS's and thereby broaden the market for such investments. H.R. REP.
No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2827, 2831-32.
81. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, §§ 104(2), 105(a), 105(b)(2), 106(a)(1)(B), 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1690-92.
82. See Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984: Hearings on
H.R. 4557 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99, 102-03 (1984) (statement of Prestin Martin, Vice Chairman, Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System) (priority is getting certain investors in mar-
ketplace by changing who is allowed to invest).
83. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834 (purpose of preemption is recognition that most
blue sky and legal investment laws were enacted before MBS's existed and that
such laws artificially restrain market).
84. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(b), 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
85. See H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834; S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2808, 2815.
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extent that state laws would authorize such entities to hold or invest
in government obligations.16 However, investment in mortgage related
securities, exempt mortgage-backed securities or securities issued or
guaranteed by FNMA or FHLMC are considered to be obligations
issued by the United States for purposes of state laws limiting the
purchase, holding or investment in such obligations.87
The rationale underlying the section 106(a) preemption is that the
majority of state laws regulating legal investments were enacted prior
to the advent of private mortgage-backed securities.88 Since many
of these investment statutes set forth lists of permissible investments
for each entity being regulated,8 9 the absence of private mortgage-
backed securities from such statutes was thought to limit demand
for such instruments artificially without regard for the soundness
of the investment.90 Thus, Congress did not rule out the prospect
of investment regulation but merely called the states' attention to
the fact that most legal investment statutes were enacted' without
private mortgage-backed securities in mind.
A. State Legal Investment Regulation
All fifty states have statutes setting forth permissible investments
for the financial institutions they charter and regulate.9' Entities that
86. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(a), 98 Stat. 1689, 1691-92.
87. Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2834.
89. See REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INSURANCE IN-
DUSTRY REGULATORY REFORM IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 19 (May 6, 1982) (review
of New York insurance company investment regulations containing "minutely de-
tailed specifications of permitted investments").
90. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2808, 2815; Brownstein & Lore, supra note 20, at 14.
91. Following is a survey of state statutes governing investments by certain
insurance companies: ALA. CODE § 27-1-8, 27-1-9 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.21.010
to .600 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-531 to -561 (1956 & Supp. 1984-
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2601 to -2638 (1980 & Supp. 1983); CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 1170-1212 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3-201 to -241
(1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-144 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1301-1332 (1974 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.301-
625.340 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-1 to -42 (1982 & Supp. 1984); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 736-737.24a (Smith-Hurd 1965 & Supp. 1984-1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 511.8 (West 1946
& Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2b01 to -2b20 (1981); KY. REV. STAT.
§9 304.7 to .7-360 (1981 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:841-22:853
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 1101-1137 (1964
[Vol. XIII
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
are generally governed by state investment laws include insurance
companies, 92 pension funds, 93 state-chartered savings and loan
associations9 ' and mutual savings banks95 and other state-chartered
financial intermediaries. 96 The principal objective of legal investment
regulation is to preserve the financial welfare of entities that serve
& Supp. 1984-1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 86-107 (1957 & Supp. 1984);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 66-68 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977 & Supp. 1984);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.901-500.947 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984-1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN §§ 61A.28-.315 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-
19-51 (Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 376.300-376.307 (1969 & Supp. 1975); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-2-801 to -852 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-309, 44-311.02, 44-
311.03 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 682A.010-682A.290 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 411:15-411:19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17B:20-1 to -8 (West 1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§59A-9-1 to -27 (1978); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1401-1414 (McKinney
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-79 to -79.1 (1982 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26.1-05-19 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3907.14 (Page 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1601-1628 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 733.510-733.780 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 504-505.1 (Purdon 1971 &
Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-11-1 to -11.1-6 (1979 & Supp. 1984);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5-1010 to -1100 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 58-27-1 to -87 (1978 & Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-303 to
-307 (1980 & Supp. 1984); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., arts. 3.39-3.41a (1981 &
Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-13-1 to -36 (1953 & Supp. 1983); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3461-3472 (1984); VA. CODE §§ 38.1-217.1 to .47 (Supp. 1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.13.010 to .360 (1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-8-1 to
-25 (1982 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.25 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. §§
26-7-101 to -116 (1977).
92. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 91.
93. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2530 (1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53216.1-
53216.3, 53216.5, 53216.6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-51-
107 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-211 (1983); N.Y. RETIRE. AND SoC. SEC.
LAW §§ 176-179-a (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1984-1985).
94. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-830, 67-834 (1980); CAL. FIN. CODE §§
7200-7902 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-114 (Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178 (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1908
(1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.0701 (West 1984); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §
9-419 (1980 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 375-412 (McKinney 1971 &
Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-9-1 to -15 (1982 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE
§§ 6.1-57 to -68.1 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-5A-22 (Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-7-
100.3 to -111 (1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-96 (West 1981);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 910 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.67 (West
1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-285 to -288 (1982 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. BANKING
LAW §§ 229-260-b (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-9-1 to
-15 (1982 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 1151-1164 (1984); VA. CODE
§§ 6.1-57 to -68.1 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
96. State-chartered credit unions typically are subject to investment regulation.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-520 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-925 (1980);
CAL. FIN. CODE. §§ 14650-14656 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §
11-30-104(1)(e) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-198(g) (West 1981 &
19851
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a quasi-public function. 97 The operation of the insurance industry,
for example, entails broad participation by the general public. 9
Individuals purchase insurance to minimize the fortuitous risks of
life and to allow for the safe accumulation of wealth for the future. 99
Policyholders, however, generally do not regard their premiums as
investments like stocks and bonds that are subject to risk of loss.' °°
Nonetheless, the manner in which an insurance company invests its
capital assets or reserves, which are primarily built upon the premiums
of policyholders, affects its solvency. 01 The same can be said for
deposits at savings banks and contributions to pension funds. 102
As a means of insuring the solvency of state-chartered and reg-
ulated financial institutions, legal investment laws typically utilize
both quantitative and qualitative standards to safeguard investors. 103
For example, many statutes require diversification of investment,104
which can be achieved by limiting the percentage of an entity's
assets that can be invested in each type of investment or by limiting
the size of any one investment." 5 Another common requirement
addresses the quality of the investment. In this regard, a statute
may forbid the purchase of a particular corporate stock unless a
dividend has been paid recently or the security has been assigned
Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 657.042 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-650(4)
(1982); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 6-603 (1980 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. BANKING
LAW §§ 450-480(b) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-21-27
(1982).
97. CENTER & HEINS, INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT 15 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as CENTER & HEINS]; REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INSURANCE
INDUSTRY REGULATORY REFORM, NEW YORK STATE 19 (May 6, 1982).
98. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02, at 2-22 (asserting broad par-
ticipation in life insurance programs by general public).
99. CENTER & HEINS, supra note 97, at 15.
100. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02, at 2-22.
101. CENTER & HEINS, supra note 97, at 25.
102. See generally R. LYNN, THE PENSION CRISIS 7 (1983) (discussion of purpose
of pension funds and typical participants); MEYER, DUESENBERRY & ALIBER, supra
note 14, at 30 (consumer protection is important reason for regulation of bank's
investment authority).
103. CENTER & HEINS, supra note 97, at 29-30.
104. See infra note 107 for discussion of the rationale behind a diversified
investment portfolio.
105. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1305(4) (Supp. 1984) (insurer may
invest no more than 50076 of its assets in mortgages not insured or guaranteed by
United States government); IDAHO CODE § 41-723(2) (1977) ("insurer shall not make
or acquire a loan or loans upon the security of any one parcel of real property
in aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 [or 1007o of its assets]"); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 1405(a)(4) (McKinney 1984) (limits an insurance company's aggregate investment
in real property to 2507o of its admitted assets and further limits such company's
investment in each individual property to 2076 of its admitted assets).
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a highly favorable evaluation by a recognized rating organization. 0 6
Both diversification and quality standards serve to reduce the inherent
risk factors that investing entails. °0
An examination of the section 106 preemption in light of the
principles underlying state legal investment laws highlights the need
for the states to enact legislation that overrides the federal preemption
before the seven year limitation period expires. Although it would
be beneficial to observe the effect of the preemption on the market
before enacting such legislation, certain factors, including the nature
of a private mortgage-backed security,0 8 the type of private mortgage-
backed security investor envisioned by SMMEA, 0 9 and the reliance
which SMMEA places on the rating organizations, 0 can be regarded
as posing a potential threat to the beneficiaries of state legal in-
vestment laws.
1. The Nature of the Private Mortgage-Backed Security
By requiring the states to treat private mortgage-backed securities
that fall within the ambit of SMMEA as the equivalent of United
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-553 (Supp. 1984) (insurer may only
invest in bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness secured by first mortgages
or deeds of trust or leasehold estates of greater than two years or more on improved
property located in United States and no such loan shall be made or acquired
except after appraisal by qualified appraiser); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(d) (West
1985). The New Jersey Statute prohibits an insurance company from purchasing
corporate stock of any class
unless (1) such corporation has paid cash dividends on such class of
stock during each of the past 5 years preceeding the time of purchase
or (2) such corporation shall have earned during the period of such 5
years an aggregate sum available for dividends upon such stock which
would have been sufficient, after all fixed charges and obligations, to
pay dividends upon all shares of such class of stock outstanding during
such period averaging 4% per annum computed upon the par value (or
in the case of stock having no par value, upon the stated capital in
respect thereof) of such stock.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(d).
107. MAYER, DUESENBERRY & ALIBER, supra note 14, at 26. The notion behind
diversification is that if an investor holds assets in his portfolio that are affected
in opposite directions by a given future event, the risks in the portfolio will be
reduced. Id. In effect, diversification renders the assets in a portfolio less risky in
the aggregate than if each component were taken separately. For example, if an
investor holds stock from one company that is likely to gain from inflation, and
stock from another company that is likely to decline in value in response to the
same event, his portfolio is less risky than if he held only one of these two assets.
Id. at 26,
108. See infra notes 111-44 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
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States' obligations for the purpose of investment regulation, Congress
has overlooked certain characteristics of these instruments which
make them potentially risky investments. The foundation of the
private mortgage-backed security is the mortgage itself."' Groups of
mortgages are assembled to form pools from which certificates are
issued" '2 or, in the case of private mortgage-backed bonds, the pools
provide collateral for borrowing." 3 In both cases, mortgages pose
many risks which affect the behavior of the mortgage pool and
ultimately influence the quality of the security. The most significant
of these risks include loss from damage or destruction to the property'"
and loss from default by the mortgagor."' In addition, it is possible
that a mortgagor will be delinquent in making his monthly pay-
ments.'' 6
In light of the risks associated with investing in mortgages, reg-
ulatory statutes traditionally have recognized the distinction between
United States'obligations and mortgages as safe investments." 7 Under
the typical investment statute," 8 the entity being regulated has broader
authority to invest in United States' obligations because they are
backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. In
contrast, greater limitations are imposed on investments in conven-
111. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text for discussion of the structure
of the MBS, MBB, and MPB.
112. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation
and structure of the MBS.113. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation
and structure of the MBB.
114. See generally Budd & Wasserman, The Yankee Mac Mortgage Pass-Through
Program: A Source of Ideas for Insurance Companies, 15 CONN. L. REV. 385,
400-02 (1983) (discussion of types of loss to be insured against in mortgage pool
and kinds of insurance issuer must purchase to insure against such losses) [hereinafter
cited as Budd & Wasserman]; Kanner, supra note 21, at 346 (insurance on mortgage
securities has four components: (1) primary mortgage insurance; (2) pool insurance;
(3) hazard insurance; and (4) coverage on performance by master servicer).
115. See Budd & Wasserman, supra note 114, at 400-402.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1 (West 1985) (unlimited authority to
invest in United States' obligations; aggregate mortgage investments may not exceed
50% of insurer's assets and single mortgage investment may not exceed 2% of
insurer's assets); N.Y. INs. LAW § 1405(a)(3) (McKinney 1984) (unlimited authority
to invest in United States'obligations; investment in any single mortgage limited to
the greater of $30,000 or 2% of admitted assets).
118. See, e.g., MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 6-603 (Supp. 1984) (credit union
has unlimited authority to invest in United States' obligations); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 19-9-2 (1956) (savings banks and savings and loan associations have unlimited
authority to invest in United States' obligations); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1151
(1984) (savings banks have unlimited authority to invest in United States' obligations).
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tional mortgages.'1 9 A statute may require that the loans be first
lien mortgages'20 or that the loans be limited to a specified percentage
of the mortgaged property's appraised value.'' Private mortgage-
backed securities are indeed distinct from the mortgages themselves.
In fact, they may be a safer investment due to the protection afforded
by insurance and by the diversity of loans in a mortgage pool.' 22
However, since private mortgage-backed securities are built upon
the mortgage, an instrument that has been viewed traditionally as
inherently risky,'23 it would be imprudent to impose on private
mortgage-backed securities the same regulatory constraints as those
imposed on United States' obligations.
Moreover, while it is possible to mitigate the risk of investing in
private mortgage-backed securities through the use of insurance on
the mortgage pool 2 4 as well as on the individual mortgages in the
pool, 25 the possibility of insurance fraud and/or insolvency makes
private mortgage-backed securities a riskier investment than United
States' obligations.' 26 In addition, the many entities and levels of
119. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text for the types of limitations
imposed by statutes regulating investment in mortgages.
120. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-553 (Supp. 1984-1985) (insurer may
only invest in bonds notes or other evidences of indebtedness which are secured
by first lien mortgages on improved property and no such loan shall be made or
acquired except after appraisal by qualified appraiser); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-
25 (1982) (insurer may only invest in bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness
which are secured by first lien mortgages upon improved or income producing
property in U.S. or Canada).
121. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-25 (1982) (loan on single family residential
dwelling not to exceed 80% of property value; loan on all other properties not to
exceed 75% of property value); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-8 (1956) (loans on residential
property not to exceed 80% of appraised property value unless for improved real
estate in residential neighborhood, designed for habitation by not more than four
families, not more than 50 miles from lending institution, and approved by two
officers).
122. See MooDY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 5.
123. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text for discussion of the risks
associated with mortgage investment.
124. See MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 14-15.
125. Id. See also Budd & Wasserman, supra note 114, at 400-02 for a discussion
of the types of insurance used in connection with the "Yankee Mac" pass-through
program.
The reason why individual mortgage insurance and pool insurance are so critical
in the case of pass-through securities is that such securities are not general obligations
of the issuer. See Marcis, supra note 26, at 109. Rather, they represent the individual
obligations of the mortgagors whose loans make up the pool. Id. Thus, the investor
must rely on insurance for protection against loss of interest or principal. Id.
126. For a discussion of the Bank of America incident, which allegedly involved
insurance fraud and insolvency, see infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
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administration involved in marketing private mortgage-backed se-
curities present many opportunities for fraud.17 A recent incident
involving the Bank of America (BOA), the nation's second largest
commercial bank, is illustrative. 2 ' The bank, which acted as the
trustee and escrow agent'2 9 for a private mortgage-backed securities
offering, essentially was forced to repurchase almost $100 million
of worthless securities from approximately twenty-five thrifts 30 that
allegedly were defrauded into purchasing them.' Specifically, the
owner of the properties underlying the securities obtained an inflated
appraisal 2 upon which he and the issuer documented a false loan.'33
127. For a discussion of the Bank of America incident, which allegedly involved
a fraudulent sale of PMBS's, see infra note 128-41 and the accompanying text.
128. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at D8, col. 1; How Bank of America Took a
$37 Million Bath In a Mortgage Scheme, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
129. A bank's obligation as trustee and escrow agent is to retain the actual
mortgage documents and oversee the collection and disbursement of monthly prin-
cipal and interest payments. Nationwide Pattern Being Found In Huge Losses on
Bad Mortgages, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Moreover, as trustee, a
bank should safeguard the interests of investors and inform them if problems
begin to arise. Id. As an escrow agent, a bank holds assets as a neutral party.
Id.
The Bank of America (BOA) was not the only bank involved in the BOA incident.
Apparently, Wells Fargo Bank, another major commercial bank located on the
West Coast, also acted as trustee and escrow agent, but for a smaller part of the
offering. Bond Buyer, Feb. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
130. The thrifts that purchased the securities are located primarily on the East
Coast. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. While approximately 25 thrifts were
involved in the BOA incident, it has been reported that dozens of such institutions
are attempting to recoup their investments in similar PMBS schemes. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
131. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. BOA originally reported that only
$37 million worth of securities had to be repurchased. Id. Shortly after this original
claim, the total was revised upward by $58 million to $95 million. N.Y. Times, Feb.
6, 1985, at D8, col. 1.
132. There is currently a growing concern in the real estate industry about faulty
appraisals. See Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1985, at 33, col. 1. The spotlight has shifted
toward appraisers as a result of declining property values. Id. An inflated appraisal,
in conjunction with a deflating market, could have serious implications for a
mortgage insurer; should the mortgagor default, the insurer would be forced to
pay the insured according to the falsely inflated value. Nevertheless, the number
of faulty appraisals may be on the rise as a crowded profession seeks to accomodate
the sellers and lenders who are their prime customers. Id.
133. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. The owner of the properties involved
in the BOA incident is West Pac Corp., a California based outfit which is controlled
by Kent B. Rogers, a convicted felon whose case is currently on appeal. Id. The
properties behind the securities are located in Texas and California. West Pac was
supposed to use its share of the proceeds from the sale of the securities to refurbish
the properties and convert them into co-ops but never did. Id.
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The issuer then packaged certificates based on the phony loan which
were subsequently sold to the thrifts through an affiliated brokerage
firm. 34 To make the securities more marketable, they were either
insured or covered by surety bonds.' 35 The company that guaranteed
most of the private mortgage-backed securities sold to the thrifts,
however, was virtually insolvent at the time of the sale. 36 Thus,
when the property owner defaulted on his monthly payment-which
was inevitable since the loan was based on a false appraisal-and
the issuer filed a claim with the insurance company, it could not
pay. "'37 Apparently, the bank's decision to repurchase the worthless
private mortgage-backed securities was motivated by its embarrass-
ment at having been involved in the scheme. "' In a similar situation,
It has also been alleged that Rogers conspired with David A. Feldman, another
convicted felon who recently served a jail sentence for an unrelated fraud. Id.
Feldman is the controlling force behind the concern that packaged and sold the
securities, the National Mortgage Equity Corp. (NMEC). Id. Feldman allegedly
collaborated with West Pac to document the false loan underlying the securities.
Id.
The conspiracy allegedly extends to a number of BOA's employees who may
have been paid off by NMEC and West Pac to convince the bank to serve as
trustee even though they were aware of the inflated appraisal and phony loan.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1. BOA's participation in the offering was
crucial because it lent an air of legitimacy that made the securities more attractive
to the investors. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
The roles of West Pac and NMEC in the BOA incident are currently being
investigated by a New York grand jury. Bond Buyer, Feb. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
Additionally, the Texas Insurance Commissioner has filed suit against West Pac
and NMEC on behalf of the Trustee for the bankrupt insurance company that
guaranteed the securities, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1, the F.B.I. is
conducting its own separate investigation of the incident, id., and BOA has filed
suits against its employees as well as NMEC and West Pac. N.Y. Times, Mar.
2, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
134. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
135. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1,
col. 1. The primary insurer in the BOA incident is the Pacific American Insurance
Company, an outfit allegedly controlled, at the time of the incident, by Rogers.
Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Another mortgage insurer involved in the
incident is the Glacier General Assurance Company, located in Missoula, Montana.
Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 46, col. 1. Glacier General has reportedly written
mortgage insurance on at least $200 million dollars worth of mortgages and is
allegedly involved in other incidents of insurance fraud related to PMBS's. Id.
136. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Pacific American insured the offer
between August of 1983 and January of 1984. Id. Apparently, the company was
"essentially insolvent" in June of 1983, almost one year prior to its official
insolvency. Id.
137. Id.
138 Id. With respect to BOA's legal obligations, it may have indemnified the
thrifts because it did not live up to its responsibility as trustee of protecting the
institutions. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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however, the investors probably would have been forced to absorb
the loss. 139
Fraud related to private mortgage-backed securities has not been
limited to this particular incident.140 Insurance regulators in Cali-
fornia, where the BOA incident originated, are currently investigating
the activities of a number of insurance companies that have also
guaranteed hundreds of millions of dollars in private mortgage-
backed securities.' 4' These inquiries have unearthed other potentially
precarious situations in which small undercapitalized companies guar-
anteed large issues of private mortgage-backed securities backed by
loans based on inflated property appraisals. 4z As the private sector
expands its participation in the secondary mortgage market, there
will be an increasing demand for mortgage insurance to protect bad
loans that do not carry government guarantees. 43 State insurance
regulators, whose task it is to monitor the activities of mortgage
insurance companies within their jurisdictions, will be unable to
prevent every fraudulent scheme from occurring. 44 Subjecting po-
139. In fact, the Wells Fargo bank has refused to reimburse four thrifts in
connection with another PMBS incident in which it acted as trustee and BOA acted
as escrow agent. Like the BOA incident, this involves a defaulted loan based on
an inflated appraisal and an insurance company that has failed to pay the claim.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Bond Buyer, Feb. 11, 1985, at 1, col.
1.
140. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1,
col. 1. It has been reported that dozens of institutions have already purchased bad
mortgage investments and are looking to be reimbursed. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1985, at 1, col. 1. Many of these incidents had their genesis on the West Coast
and involved some of the same parties connected with the BOA incident. Id. The
reason why fraud has been so pervasive in connection with PMBS's may be that
the process by which mortgages are converted into securities insulates the investor
from his purchase and forces him to rely on the judgment of others as to its
soundness. In a sense, the investor is issuing a mortgage loan "without meeting
the borrowers, inspecting the properties or having appraisals made." Id.
141. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. The Glacier General Assurance
Company, which has been actively insuring mortgages in California, was recently
ordered to cease and desist from selling mortgage insurance in that state. Wall St.
J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 46, col. 1. Glacier allegedly guaranteed approximately $21
million worth of loans which are delinquent and based on inflated appraisals. Id.;
see also Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Glacier General is currently the
subject of a grand jury investigation in Los Angeles for its role in the BOA incident
as well as its other activities in the state. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
142. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 46, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
143. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985 at 1, col. 1.
144. See, e.g., id. (insurance regulators involved in BOA incident were slow in
perceiving fraud and insolvency of Pacific American).
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tential private mortgage-backed securities investors to more stringent
investment regulations than those mandated by the federal preemption
would minimize the risk of fraud associated with the purchase of
private mortgage-backed securities.
2. The Private Mortgage-Backed Security Investor
Private mortgage-backed securities are marketed primarily to large
institutional investors145 to whom the policies underlying the invest-
ment statutes apply with equal force. 46 The insurance companies
and thrifts that Congress intended to reach with the section 106(a)
preemption are "affected with a public interest"'' 47 regardless of their
sizes. In fact, the larger the entity being regulated, the greater a
state's interest in preserving its financial health since the entity's
failure would have a disastrous effect on individual policyholders
who are likely to be unsophisticated consumers as well as on the
overall economy. 148
One specific reason for questioning the wisdom of exempting even
the more sophisticated institutional investors from regulations gov-
erning investment in private mortgage-backed securities concerns the
effects of deregulation of the banking system on the thrift industry. 149
Deregulation has intensified competition among thrifts for high yield-
ing loans to help pay the high interest rates needed to attract
depositors.5 0 The result has been a limited supply of assets in a
high demand economic environment.'' In this respect, private mort-
gage-backed securities are an ideal investment for a thrift because
they offer high yields without the cost and overhead of underwriting
mortgages. 5 2 Consequently, thrifts are already among the leading
purchasers of private mortgage-backed securites'53 especially in the
145. See MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d1 (major MBS investors,
ranked in descending order, are thrifts, private and public pension funds, commercial
banks and insurance companies).
146. See MAYER, DUESENBERRY & ALIBER, supra note 14, at 31. Banks and other
financial intermediaries create a major part of the money supply. Id. It is thus
necessary to prevent such institutions from taking too many risks because a wave
of failures could destroy a large portion of the money supply, result in a loss of
public confidence, and ultimately lead to a depression. Id.
147. See CENTER & HEINS, supra note 97, at 15.
148. See MAYER, DUESENBERRY & ALIBER, supra note 14, at 31.
149. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 19.
152. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
153. See MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[71[d] (savings and loan
associations leading purchasers of mortgage-backed securities as of June, 1983).
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Northeast where loan demand is lagging far behind healthy deposit
growth. 5 4 The problem with the thrifts investing in such large quan-
tities of private mortgage-backed securities is that they might succumb
to the temptation to purchase securities that, because of a hasty
examination, turn out to be worthless.'55 In fact, it has been suggested
that the thrifts involved in the BOA incident were enticed by this
very trap. 5 6
3. The Rating Agencies
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the section 106(a) preemption
is its reliance on the rating agencies as substitutes for the regulatory
constraints provided by investment statutes. A security does not
qualify for the section 106(a) preemption unless it is a "mortgage
related securit[y],"''5 which must be "rated in one of the two highest
rating categories by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating
organization."'5 8 According to the rating definitions issued by Stand-
ard & Poor's, the leading rating agency evaluating mortgage-backed
securities,'59 the two highest rating categories are "AAA" and
"AA."' ' 60 In essence, these top rating categories are an opinion by
the rating organization that the potential of the security being rated
to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong. 61 In this
respect, the "AAA" rating differs from the lower "AA" rating
only to a small degree. 61
Despite their pronouncements as to the safety of a "AAA" or
"AA" investment rating, the rating agencies do not provide investor
154. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, 98 Stat. 1689, 1691-92.
158. Id. at 1689.
159. Rating agencies are "[o]rganizations which provide the service of evaluating
the relative creditworthiness of Issues and assigning Ratings to them, such as Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., Standard & Poor's Corporation, and Fitch's Investors
Service." J. PENDERGAST & D. FRANKLIN, GLOSSARY OF PUBLIC FINANCE TERMI-
NOLOGY 27 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PENDERGAST & FRANKLIN]. Ratings are "[lietter
and number symbols used by Rating Agencies to express their evaluation of the
relative creditworthiness of an Issue.' Id.
160. Id. at 38. "Debt rated AAA has the highest rating assigned by Standard
& Poor's. Capacity to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong. Debt
rated AA has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal and differs
from the higher rated issues only in small degree." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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protection that is the equivalent of an investment statute. On a
general level, the agencies' primary goal is not investor protection.
Rather, the main purpose of securities ratings is to provide a uniform
evaluation of a particular product so that an investor can make an
informed decision based, in part, on the rating that has evaluated
the credit risks. 63 Furthermore, the agencies do not guarantee the
accuracy of their ratings, 164 and, therefore, they urge investors to
conduct their own analyses of any issuer whose securities they con-
sider purchasing. 165 The investor also must bear in mind that the
rating agency customarily receives a fee from the issuer of the
securities it evaluates.166 In light of the rating agencies' function,
67
it would be anomolous to assign to them the responsibility of investor
protection especially since they are not accountable to the general
public. 168
Specifically, there are a number of concerns about the process
employed by the rating agencies which focus attention on the need
for legislation overriding the federal preemption. Foremost is the
idea that the organizations do not subscribe to any uniform approach
to rating private mortgage-backed securities 169 and are free to alter
163. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984: Hearing on H.R.
4557 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
132 (1984) (statement of John M. Teutsch Jr., CMB, Mortgage Bankers Association).
164. See, e.g., MooDY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
165. Id.; see also PENDERGAST & FRANKLIN, supra note 159, at 42 ("[a]s ratings
are designed exclusively for the purpose of grading bonds according to their
investment qualities, they should not be used alone as a basis for investment
operations").
166. See, e.g., MooDY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 2; see
also PENDERGAST & FRANKLIN, supra note 159, at 40 (Standard & Poor's customarily
receives fee from issuer).
167. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text for discussion of the function
of rating agencies and purpose of ratings.
168. See Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984: Hearing on
H.R. 4557 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
47 (1984) (statement of Richard R. Malmgren, Sec., North American Securities
Administrators Assoc.).
169. A comparison between the approach used by Standard & Poor's and that
used by Moody's illustrates a significant divergence in their methods. Standard &
Poor's claims to utilize a "four step" process that is composed of the following
steps: (1) assessing the legal infrastructure of the issue; (2) identifying the potential
areas of loss exposure; (3) assessing whether the amount of loss protection provided
to cover the risks is adequate; and (4) evaluating the creditworthiness of the entities
providing the loss protection. D. Tibbals, Rating Approach in STANDARD & POOR'S
CRITERIA FOR RATING MORTGAGE SECURITIEs 3 (Feb. 13, 1984) (presented at seminars
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their methods whenever they deem it necessary.7 0
Furthermore, under any of the mortgage pool analyses employed
by the agencies that rate private mortgage-backed securities, 7 ' an
investment grade rating always can be attained provided there is an
adequate trade-off between certain desirable characteristics of the
mortgage pool and the amount of loss coverage on the pool. 72
Therefore, the process by which the rating agencies determine how
much loss coverage is necessary for a particular pool is probably
the most crucial aspect of rating private mortgage-backed securities.'73
In this regard, however, many of the characteristics of mortgages
are not quantifiable in terms of their effect on the mortgage pool. 74
Consequently, the rating agencies generally have utilized a normative
approach to deriving their loss assumptions. '7 That is, they have
held on Oct. 30-31, 1983, Jan. 12, 1984, and Feb. 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Tibbals]. Moody's, on the other hand, stands by what it calls a "building block"
approach. MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 4. According
to Moody's Corporate Credit Report, the "building block" approach entails iden-
tifying each credit risk in a transaction, assessing the level of risk of each credit
element, and, finally, weighing the combined risks of all the credit characteristics.
Id. The report goes on to state, however, that when a rating is based solely on
external support rather then the underlying quality of the mortgage pool, the
"building block" approach is not used. Id. at 5. Thus, the rating agencies have
a great deal of discretion in choosing their approach to rating PMBS's.
170. PENDERGAST & FRANKLIN, supra note 159, at 38.
171. Standard & Poor's Corporation and Moody's Investor Service are currently
the only agencies that rate PMBS's. For discussion of their approach to rating
PMBS's, see MooDY's CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, and Tibbals,
supra note 169.
172 See generally MOODY'S CORPORATE CREDIT REPORT, supra note 50, at 29-
31 (guidelines for cash flow over-collateralization and pool insurance coverage).
Both of the aforementioned charts specify the amount of additional overcollater-
alization or insurance that is necessary to obtain an investment grade rating in the
presence of various risk characteristics.
173. Tibbals, supra note 169, at 4. In analyzing credit risk, Standard & Poor's
makes two key assumptions: (1) the percentage of loans in the pool that will go
into foreclosure, and (2) the average loss that will be realized on these loans. Id.
"The amount of loss coverage needed is simply the product of these two as-
sumptions." Id.
174. Assumptions regarding foreclosure frequency and loss severity are made
based on specific characteristics of the pool. In the case of a "prime pool," which
has the lowest risk characteristics, these assumptions can be made with a fair degree
of certainty. Id. at 5. For a non-prime pool, however, there is less empirical data
available on how certain important characteristics will effect loss assumptions. Id.
at 6-7. In this respect, Standard & Poor's points out that the following characteristics
have the most influence on their loss assumptions: lien status; types of secured
property; loan-to-value ratios; loan rate and payment terms; geographic location
of secured properties; purpose of loan; loan size; and number of loans. Id.
175. Tibbals, supra note 169, at 7.
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arrived at their conclusions as to how much loss coverage is necessary
on a particular pool based on their perceptions of the risks rather
than on the evidence of specific empirical data.'76 As the market
matures and the behavior of mortgage pools becomes more readily
ascertainable, the rating agencies undoubtedly will incorporate ad-
ditional empirical data into their rating processes. 177 However, many
of the variables that affect the behavior of mortgage pools are simply
not amenable to empirical analysis. 78
V. Section 106(c) and the Need for Overriding Legislation
Section 106(c) preempts blue sky laws in order to exempt, to the
same extent as United States obligations, mortgage related securities
or exempt mortgage-backed securities from state laws requiring reg-
istration or qualification of securities or real estate.'7 9 Congress did
not intend this provision to affect state anti-fraud statutes or any
other state regulations governing the operations of dealers and un-
derwriters of exempt mortgage-backed securities or mortgage related
securities. 180
The section 106(c) preemption is a result of the Congressional
belief that state securities law registration requirements were dupli-
cative of those mandated by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) under federal securities law'"' thus imposing additional and
unnecessary costs on the marketing of mortgage-backed securities.'
8 2
The enactment of the 106(c) preemption also may have been mo-
tivated by the desire to match the existing exemptions for securities
issued or guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC.'83
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
180. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2809, 2815.
181. Registration of securities under federal law is governed by the Securities
Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. The underlying policy of registration under
the federal scheme is one of full disclosure; the registrant must reveal to the
investing public complete and truthful information about the offering as well as
the issuer. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
182. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2809, 2815.
183. See infra note 193 and accompanying text; see also Secondary Mortgage
Market Market Enhancement Act of 1984: Hearing on H.R. 4557 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1984) (statement of
David Beal, Pres., Norwest Mortgage Inc. and Residential Funding Corp.).
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A. Blue Sky Laws
The first blue sky laws were enacted during the early twentieth
century before securities regulation existed on a federal level. 184 Their
immediate popularity reflected the public's fear that trading in mer-
chandise as intricate as securities would give rise to countless op-
portunities for dishonesty.'85 The purpose of blue sky laws is to
protect the investing public from fraud and from highly speculative
offerings." 6 Thus, blue sky laws generally impose regulations on all
types of investment schemes.' 87
To date, virtually every state has some form of blue sky legis-
lation. 8  Moreover, in 1956, a Uniform State Securities
184. L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loss
& COWETT. Kansas usually is given credit for enacting the first statute in 1913.
Id. When the Securities Act of 1933 was finally enacted, Congress specifically
preserved the states' right to regulate securities rather than attempting to preempt
the field. Id.
185. Id. at 3.
186. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, § 102, at 1-6.
187. 69 AM. JUR. 2D State Securities Regulation § 1, at 1059 (1973) (blue sky
laws affect any enterprise where investor's profits are contingent upon management
and operation of others and which has characteristics of activities of corporation,
trust or similar other business structure).
188. ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-1 to -60 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010 to .270 (1980
& Supp. 1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801 to -2066.10 (1956 & Supp.
1984-1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to -1264.14 (1980 & Supp. 1983); CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 25,000- 27,203 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§
11-51-101 to -129 (1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-470 to -
502 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 7301-7328 (1974 &
Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.011-517.32 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-5-1 to -24 (1982 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 485-1
to -25 (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1401 to -1462 (1980 & Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.1-137.16 (1960 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-2-1-1 to -1-24 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101-502.612 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1252 to -1284 (1981 & Supp. 1984); Ky.
REV. STAT. §§ 292.310-292.991 (1981 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
51:701-51:720 (West 1965 & Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 751-
891 (1964 & Supp. 1984-1985); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -
805 (1975 & Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, §§ 101-417 (West
1975 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 451.501-451.818 (1967 & Supp. 1984-
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80A.01-80A.31 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-71-101 to -735 (Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 409.101-409.418 (1979 &
Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-101 to -308 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
8.1101 to -1124 (1943 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 90.010-90.205 (1983);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-B:1 to -B:34 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47
to -76 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13-1 to -47 (1984);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359h (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -65 (1979 & Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-04-01 to -
19 (1976 & Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01-1707.99 (Page 1978 &
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Act' 18 9 was promulgated which has since been adopted substantially
by most states. 90 Although no two state statutes are wholly iden-
tical, 19 all are comprised of at least one of three distinct types of
regulatory devices. 192 These include: (1) anti-fraud provisions;' 93 (2)
provisions requiring registration or licensing of certain persons en-
gaging in the securities business; 194 and (3) provisions requiring the
registration and licensing of securities. 95 Each of these regulatory
devices embodies a different philosophical approach to the same
end-protecting the investing public. 96
Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1-502 (West 1965 & Supp. 1984-1985);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.005-59.995 (1983); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-101 to -704
(Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-11-1 to -30 (1979 & Supp. 1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 47-31-1 to -147 (1983 & Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2-101 to
-201 (1984); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 to -39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp.
1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1953 & Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 4201-4241 (1984); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (1978 & Supp. 1984);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.005 to .940 (1978 & Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE §§
32-1-101 to -4-418 (1982 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 551.01-551.69 (West
1984); WYo STAT. §§ 17-4-101 to -129 (1977 & Supp. 1984)
189. The Uniform Securities Act was drafted by Professor Louis Loss of Harvard
Law School and his associate Edward M. Cowett. Uniform Securities Act (1958).
They undertook the drafting of the Act at the prompting of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, §
1.03, at 1-11.
190. The states which have coordinated their securities laws with the Uniform
Securities Act include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, § 1.03 n.25,
at 1-14.
191. Loss & COWETT, supra note 184, at 18.
192. Id. at 19. The states generally have not treated these provisions as being
mutually exclusive. Instead, they have determined that combinations of two or
three of these provisions provide the best investor protection. See SOWARDS &
HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01, at 7-3, 7-4.
193. Loss & COWETT, supra note 184, at 19. The anti-fraud provisions provide
the administrator with an opportunity to issue public warnings, to investigate
fraudulent activites, to take injunctive or other measures to stop them and ultimately
to punish them. Id.
194. Loss & COWETT, supra note 184, at 19. Registration of brokers, dealers
and investment advisors is aimed at preventing fraudulent and unqualified persons
from participating in the securities business, at supervising their activities once
registration has taken place and at revoking their registration should they fall
below the statutory standards. Id.
195. See infra notes 198-202 for a discussion of the policy behind registration
of securities under the blue sky laws.
196. Loss & COWETT, supra note 184, at 19.
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The section 106(c) preemption purports to affect only those pro-
visions in blue sky laws requiring registration and qualification of
securities. 97 Registration of securities offerings under blue sky laws
is similar to registration under the federal structure in that full
disclosure of all relevant and material facts is required. 9 The state
registration process, however, also may impose substantive standards
concerning the securities to be issued, the issuer, or other charac-
teristics of the offering. 99 Should the registrant fail to comply with
these so-called merit standards, the state administrator2 ° has the
option to refuse an application for registration. 20 1 The rationale
behind merit regulation is that the "man in the street" does not
have the expertise to evaluate a complicated prospectus and to
determine whether an investment is a sound one. 202
The section 106(c) preemption specifically provides that exempt
mortgage-backed securities or mortgage-related securities should be
treated as the equivalent of United States' obligations for the purpose
of registration under state securites laws.2"3 This essentially amounts
197. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692; see also S. REP No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2809, 2815 (bill preempts
securities registration provisions in blue sky laws; does not overturn anti-fraud
statutes or other requirements imposed on dealers and underwriters); H.R. REP.
No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2827, 2834 (legislation preempts laws requiring state registration of securities).
198. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in Merit Requirements?, 1976
Wis. L. REV. Pt. 1, at 79, 80 [hereinafter cited as Goodkind]. Full disclosure
requires that the issuer divulge to the investing public complete and truthful in-
formation about the securities being offered. See SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note
3, § 1.02, at 1-7, 1-8. Upon full disclosure, the issuer is entitled to register the
securities, regardless of how speculative they may be. See id. at 1-8. The notion
behind full disclosure is that an investor who hopes to achieve a greater return
has the right to place his money in a highly speculative offering provided that the
nature of the enterprise has been fully revealed. Id. The Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, is a typical example of a disclosure oriented statute. See
SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, § 1.02, at 1-7, 1-8.
199. See SOWARDS & HIRSCH supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01, at 7-2, 7-3.
200. The administrator generally is an agency or official, such as the attorney
general, that oversees the daily operation of the blue sky law and renders the policy
decisions that must often be made. See Loss & COWETT, supra note 184, at 46.
201. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01, at 7-2, 7-3.
202. Id. at § 1.02, 1-7. Merit regulation is one of the most controversial aspects
of blue sky law. See, e.g., Goodkind, supra note 198, at 79; Hueni, Application
of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417
(1969). But see Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60
MARQUETTE L. REV. 367 (1977).
203. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
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to a complete exemption for such securities because the Uniform
Securities Act and other relevant statutes include United States'
obligations on their lists of exempt securities.2° The rationale behind
this broad exemption may be that private morLgage-backed securities
204. Section 4.02(a)(1) of the Uniform Securities Act exempts securities issued
or guaranteed by the United States from blue sky registration. Uniform Securities
Act § 4.02(a)(1) (1958). Thirty-one states have substantially adopted the language
of the Uniform Act. ALA. CODE § 8-6-10(1) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.140(a)(1)
(1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(a)(1) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § I1-51-113(l)(a)
.(Supp. 1984);. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-490(a)(1) (West 1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(a)(1) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.051(1) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1434(1) (1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.3(A) (Supp. 1984);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-2(a)(1) (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.202(1)
(West Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.400.1 (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 873(1) (1964); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601(1) (Supp.
1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. l10A, § 402(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 451.802(a)(1) (Supp. 1984-1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-201(1)
(Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.402(a)(1) (1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
104(1) (1983); NEB. REV. CODE § 8-1110(1) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-50(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-29(A) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 78A-16(l) (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984-
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-310(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-16-103(a)(1) (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14(1)(a) (Supp. 1983); VA.
CODE § 13.1-514(a)(1) (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.310(1) (1983); W.
VA. CODE § 32-4-402(a)(1) (1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-114(a)(i) (1977). Fur-
thermore, eighteen states have adopted comparable exemptions. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1843.01 (Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(a) (West Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-8(1) (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-4(1) (1976);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1261(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:704(2) (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15(1)(a) (West Supp. 1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(I)(a) (1983); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 359f(l)(a)
(McKinney 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05(1) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.02(B)(1), (3) (Page Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.025(1) (1984);
70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-8(b) (1969); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31-67
(1983); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(M) (Vernon Supp. 1985)).
There are essentially two categories of exemptions: exempt securities and exempt
transactions. SOWARDS & HIRSCH supra note 3, pt. 1, § 4.01. The effect of an
exemption is not to remove a security or transaction from the purview of the
statute; it merely provides relief from the formal registration requirements as to
that security or that transaction. Id.
An example of an exempt transaction is § 402(b)(8) of the Uniform Securities
Act which exempts
any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, insurance
company, investment company as defined in the Investment Company
Act of 1940, pension or profit sharing trust, or other financial institution
or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the purchaser is
acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity ....
Uniform Securities Act § 402(b)(8) (1958). The rationale behind this exemption is
that the purchasers enumerated in the provision generally are thought to be so
sophisticated and knowledgeable of the securities market that they do not require
the protection of the blue sky laws. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 1, §
5.
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are primarily purchased by institutional investors, and since it is
generally assumed that such investors are sufficiently sophisticated
and have adequate expertise in evaluating securities, they will not
require the protection afforded by the blue sky laws. 205 However,
for the same reasons that the preemption of state investment laws
affecting investment in private mortgage-backed securities should not
remain in effect, 20 6 the states should enact blue sky legislation ov-
erriding the section 106(c) preemption. 20 7 The need for such regulation
is particularly urgent to protect the small private mortgage-backed
security investor. 08 In both areas, the ultimate risk rests on the small
unsophisticated investor, either directly in the case of a small investor
who purchases private mortgage-backed securities or indirectly in
the case of an individual who invests his funds with some financial
intermediary .209
The enactment of blue sky legislation overriding the federal
preemption would expose private mortgage-backed securities issuers
to the civil and criminal sanctions that are available under many
state provisions.210 Moreover, the state administrator would have the
205. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
1821, S.1822, and S. 2040 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 329 (1983) (report of Kevin F. Winch, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress).
206. See supra notes 111-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors
which led to the conclusion that the states should enact overriding legislation
replacing the § 106(a) preemption.
207. See infra notes 222-38 and accompanying text for discussion of proposed
blue sky legislation to override the § 106(c) preemption.
208. Although they are marketed primarily to institutional investors, PMBS's,
as well as government agency MBS's, are presently available in amounts as little
as $1,000. Such securities will be purchased by individual investors, those who are
most in need of the protection under the blue sky laws. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1985, at D21, col. 1; Dreyfus, Just Passing Through, MONEY, Apr. 1984,
at 101.
209. Registration of securities under the blue sky laws is to protect consumers
from purchasing worthless securities. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying
text. Investment regulation, on the other hand, is designed to preserve the fiscal
welfare of state-chartered financial institutions, primarily for the benefit of con-
sumers who utilize the services of these regulated entities. See supra notes 97-102.
210. Section 410(a) of the Uniform Securities Act provides that a vendor is
strictly liable for the offer or sale of unregistered securities. Uniform Securities
Act § 410(a) (1958). Only seven states have adopted the specific Uniform Act
provisions. ALASKA STAT. §45.55.220(a)(1) (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(a)(1)
(1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(1) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-498 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408(a) (West
Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410(a) (1982); Wvo STAT. ANN. § 17-4-
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opportunity to consider an offering of securities prior to solicitation
and to bar from registration those securities that do not meet the
122(a) (1977). A majority of states allow for a private civil action for the sale of
unregistered securities. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1956); CAL, CORP. CODE
§ 25,503 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7323(a) (1974); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-5-14(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1446(1) (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.501
(West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:715(A)(1) (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 881(1)(a) (1964); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-703(a) (Supp. 1984);
MASS. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. l10A, § 410(a) (West 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §
451,810(a) (Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23(l) (West Supp. 1984);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.411(a) (1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-307(1) (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1118(1) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:25(I) (1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a)(1) (West 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(1)
(1979); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-1490 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-122(d)(1) (Supp.
1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(1) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 13.1-522(a) (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(1)(a) (1964).
The Uniform Securities Act additionally provides for civil actions by the purchaser
against a vendor who acts as broker-dealer, investment advisor or agent without
registering (§ 201(a)); represents that registration constitutes approval by the ad-
ministrator of any person, security or transaction (§ 405(b)); fails to file with the
administrator any advertising or sales literature that he may require (§ 403); sells
securities without submitting a prospectus to purchasers in accordance with the
sales of the administrator (§ 304(d)); fails to comply with escrow conditions that
the administrator may order in connection with securities sold to promoters at a
price less than the public offering price or sold for consideration other than cash
(§ 305(g)); or fails to comply with the form of sales contract for the sale of
securities as required by the administrator (§ 305(h)). Uniform Securities Act (1958).
With respect to criminal remedies, § 409 of the Uniform Securities Act provides
that any person who willfully violates any provision of the Act may be subject to
a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisoned for up to three years, or both. Uniform
Securities Act § 409 (1958). While approximately one-half of the jurisdictions have
adopted the Uniform Act provision (Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachussetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montanna, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), all have
enacted statutes which impose criminal sanctions for blue sky violations. ALA. CODE
§ 8-6-18 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.210 (1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 67-
1264 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.10 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,540
(West. Supp. 1985); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-124 (1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-497 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7322 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.302 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-24 (1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-21 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1443 (1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. §
23-2-1-18.1 (Burns 1984); IowA CODE ANN. § 502.605 (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN
STAT. ANN. § 17-1267 (1981 & Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.991 (Supp.
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:716 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 754(1) (Supp. 1984 & 1985); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-
705 (1975 & Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I10A, § 409 (West 1975);
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
statute's merit standards."' Registration probably would have a de-
terrent effect on those contemplating fraudulent schemes to market
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.809 (Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.22
(Supp. 1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-735 (Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.410
(1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-306 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1117 (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.190 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421B:24 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 49:3-70 (West 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-43 (1978); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 358 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-57 (1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-04-18 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.99 (Page Supp.
1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 71, § 407 (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 59.991 (1984); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-511 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-11-24 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1590 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-123 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23
(Supp. 1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (Vernon 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-21 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. § 4238 (1984); VA. CODE § 13.1-
520 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.400 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-409 (1982);
WYo. STAT. § 17-4-121 (1977).
211. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role
of merit standards in the registration of securities under blue sky laws.
Under the Uniform Act, the state administrator retains broad regulatory powers.
SOWARDS & HIRSCH supra note 3, pt. 2, § 10.01, at 10-1, 10-2. In general, the
administrator may "make, amend, and rescind such rules, forms, and orders as
are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the] act . . . ." Uniform Securities
Act § 412 (1958). The only real limitation on the power of the state administrator
is that a rule, order or form may not be adopted, amended or rescinded unless
he determines that such action is necessary and appropriate for the protection of
investors or the public interest and consistent with the purposes fairly intended by
the policy and provisions of the Act. Uniform Securities Act § 412(b) (1958).
The Uniform Act also gives state administrators both investigatory and subpoena
power to determine whether violations of the Act are occuring or are about to
occur. Uniform Securities Act § 407 (1958). This provision gives the administrator
the authority to conduct public and private investigations, receive statements pre-
raining to the matter under investigation, administer oaths, subpoena witnesses,
and seek judicial relief for failure to obey a subpoena. Id. Thirty-five states have
substantially adopted this provision. ALA. CODE § 8-6-15 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.190 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1822, 44-1823, 44-1825 (Supp. 1984-
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1253 (1980 & Supp. 1983); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25531
(West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-15-119 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-495 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7319 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
517.201 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1440, 30-1441 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 502.603 (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1265 (1981 & Supp.
1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.460 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51-709(C) (West
Supp. 1984); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-701 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. I10A, § 407 (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.807 (1967);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.20 (Supp. 1984); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-71-701 to -
709 (Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.407 (1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
304 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1115 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.170 (1983);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:22 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-68 (West 1970);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-46 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-16.1 (Supp. 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 405 (West 1984-1985); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1-510 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1440 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-118 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-19 (Supp.
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questionable private mortgage-backed securities2"2 as well as controlling
the quality of private mortgage-backed securities that are available
on the market.
VI. Recommendations
A. Legal Investment Regulation
The states should enact legislation overriding the preemption of
their legal investment laws by section 106(a) of the SMMEA. Pro-
cedurally, section 106(b) provides a seven year period during which
the states may enact such legislation, and it further requires that a
statute overriding the section 106(a) preemption must refer specifically
to the federal preemption in order to be effective.213
In drafting legislation that overrides the federal preemption, the
states should impose investment limitations on private mortgage-
backed securities similar to those governing investment in residential
mortgages, 2 4 which incorporate both quantitative and qualitative
1983); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-407 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.56 (1964); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-4-119 (1977).
Finally, as an alternative or in addition to an action for an injunction, an
administrator may issue a cease and desist order. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note
3, pt. 2, § 10.04, at 10-12, 10-13. An administrator may issue such an order if
he believes that any person has engaged in or is about to engage in an act constituting
a violation of the blue sky law. Id. at 10-14. Twenty-two jurisdictions expressly
grant the administrator statutory authority to issue cease and desist orders. ALASKA
STAT. § 45.55.200(1) (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2032(1) (Supp. 1984-
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1254(a) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25532 (West
Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-496 (West 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
517.221 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-13(a)(1) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. §
23-2-1-17.1(a) (Burns 1984 & Supp, 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.604(1) (West
Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1266a(a) (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. § 11-701(a)(4) (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I1OA, § 407A(West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.808(a) (Supp. 1984-1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 80A.21(l)(a) (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-305(1)(a)
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:23(I) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-47
(1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.23(H) (Page Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT.§ 59.245(4) (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31-96 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-23(A) (Vernon Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.390(1) (1983).
In other jurisdictions, the administrator relies on his broad grant of authority
to make such "orders as are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the] act
.... " Uniform Securities Act § 412(a) (1958).
212. See SOWARDS & HIRSCH supra note 3, pt. 1, § 1.02, at 1-9.
213. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440; § 106(b), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
214. See supra notes 120-21 for examples of statutes that regulate investment in
mortgages by various state-chartered financial institutions.
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standards to protect investors.2"5 A diversified investment portfolio
reduces the risk that an institution will fail due to a concentration
of its assets in any one holding that turns out to be bad or worthless.2 16
To achieve diversification, an institution should be limited to investing
only a specified percentage of its assets in private mortgage-backed
securities as well as in any one pool. To prevent investment in highly
speculative instruments, there should be a minimum quality standard21 7
which requires mortgages in an underlying pool to be first lien
mortgages on residential property and limits the amount of each
loan to a certain percentage of the appraised value of the property. 218
Pool insurance 2 9 also should be required or in the case of mortgage-
backed bonds a specified level of overcollateralization.
A further consideration in drafting legal investment regulation is
the nature of the industry that will be affected. The life insurance
industry, for example, has traditionally been subject to more stringent
regulatory constraints then most other institutional investors probably
because of its quasi-public function. 220
The following is a sample statute regulating the investment in
private mortgage-backed securities by a state chartered life insurance
company:
(a) A life insurance company authorized to transact insurance
within this state may invest in, purchase, or hold a mortgage par-
ticipation, pass-through, conventional pass through, trust certificate,
215. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 17B:20-1(c) (West 1984) (insurer may invest up
to 2% of assets in any one loan and up to 5006 of assets in aggegate mortgage
investments); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-25(a)(1) (1982) (insurer may invest in bonds,
notes or other evidences of indebtedness secured by first mortgage).
216. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
diversification requirements in investment statutes.
217. See supra note 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the quality
standards in legal investment statutes.
218. In this regard, a distinction should be drawn between those PMBS's which
are backed exclusively by conventional mortgages and those which are backed by
FHA insured and VA guaranteed mortgages. Since the federally guaranteed mort-
gages are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, no minimum
loan-to-value or first lien mortgage requirement is necessary in their case. See supra
note 47 for a discussion of the FHA and VA mortgage insurance programs.
219. The pool insurance requirement would be meaningless unless the companies
which provide such coverage are held to a minimum capitalization requirement and
are subject to increased scrutiny by state insurance regulators. Pool insurers should
be subject to strict regulatory standards because the risks associated with investing
in mortgages may be substantially magnified when such instruments are pooled.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of mortgage insurance.
220. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rationale behind legal investment laws affecting insurance companies.
[Vol. XIII
SECONDAR Y MOR TGA GE MARKET
or other similar security which represents an undivided, beneficial
interest in a pool of loans provided:
(i) that such loans are secured by first lien mortgages upon fee
simple, unencumbered real property which is improved with a res-
idential building or condominium unit or buildings designed for
occupation by not more than four persons;
(ii) that the loans in such pool shall not exceed eighty percent of
the' appraised value of the real estate mortgaged; and
(iii) that such pool is insured by an insurer authorized to transact
mortgage guarantee insurance in this state in accordance with the
rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the commissioner
after due notice and hearing.
(b) No insurance company shall, pursuant to this subsection, invest
more than five percent of its total admitted assets in any mortgage
pool, nor shall its total investments, pursuant to this subsection,
exceed more than twenty five percent of its admitted assets.
(c) This subsection is specifically intended to replace section 106(a)
of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act.22" '
B. Blue Sky Legislation
The states should enact legislation overriding the preemption of
their blue sky laws by section 106(c) of SMMEA. To this end,
section 106(c) is procedurally akin to section 106(b) in that it also
reserves a seven year period during which the states may enact such
legislation. 222 Additionally, any statute purporting to require regis-
tration of private mortgage-backed securities under the blue sky laws
must "specifically refer" to section 106(c) to be effective. 223
The best vehicle to replace the federal preemption is amendment
of the Uniform Securities Act which has been adopted by a majority
of the states. 24 The amendment also would provide states with
existing statutes an opportunity to examine the new provisions and
to revise their existing regulatory scheme.
221. This proposed statute is modeled after a Georgia statute governing insurance
company investment in pass-through securities (GA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-25.1 (Supp.
1984)) and a New Jersey statute governing insurance company investment in mort-
gages (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(c) (West 1984)).
222. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689, 1692.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 190 for a survey of the states that have substantially adopted
the Uniform Securities Act.
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The proposed amendment should bring the private mortgage-backed
securities affected by the federal preemption within the purview of
the Uniform Securities Act registration provisions which provide for
three different types of registration: 25 notification, 226 coordination 227
and qualification. 22s Notification, the simplest method, is generally
reserved for the highest quality issues of corporate securities. 229
Registration by coordination is a method that is frequently used
when the securities are also being registered under the Securities Act
of 1933.230 To register by coordination, the registrant must provide
the administrator with the information that has been filed with the
SEC. The registration is effective when the administrator has been
notified that the federal registration is effective. 23' Finally, registration
by qualification is used primarily in connection with an original
offering of securities.2 32 Registration by qualification is effective only
pursuant to a formal order by the administrator. To obtain such
225. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01[1]. Those states that have
adopted the Uniform Securities Act utilize one or more or any combination of
these types of registration. Id.
226. Uniform Securities Act § 302 (1958).
227. Uniform Securities Act § 303 (1958).
228. Uniform Securities Act § 304 (1958).
229. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01[l], at 7-4 to -8. Registration
by notification is limited to those companies which: (a) have been in continuous
operation for at least five years; (b) have not defaulted in payment of principal,
interest or dividends of any security during the preceeding three years; and (c)
have had average earnings of no less than 5o on its common shares. Uniform
Securities Act § 302(a)(1) (1958).
A notification statement must contain the following information concerning the
issuer or any of its subsidiaries: name, address, form of organization, state in
which organized, character of business, description of stock options and certain
financial data. Uniform Securities Act § 302(b) (1958).
Registration by notification takes effect immediately on the second full business
day after filing or before that if the administrator so decides, provided that no
stop order is in effect. Uniform Securities Act § 302(c) (1958).
230. See SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01, at 7-8 to -11. The
notion behind registration by coordination is that it avoids duplication since the
information required by federal and state agencies for the of registration is essentially
the same.
231. Id.
232. Forty-six states have adopted this method of registration. ALA. CODE § 8-
6-7 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.100 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1891
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1244 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113 (West 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-109 (3) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-
487 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7306 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.081
(1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-5(b) (1982 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
485-10 (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 30-1423 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, § 137.5(C) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-5 (Burns 1984); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.207 (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1258 (1981);
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an order, the registrant must supply the administrator with an ap-
plication accompanied by the extensive list of information and doc-
uments required by the statute. 3
In drafting an amendment to the Uniform Securities Act, it is
important for Congress to recognize that SMMEA encompasses
both private mortgage-backed securities that are subject to registra-
tion under the federal securities law and some that are not.234 There-
fore, those private mortgage-backed securities that are subject to
registration on a federal level because they do not qualify for the
section 4(5) exemption to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should
Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.370 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:708 (West 1965 &
Supp. 1984); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. I10A, § 303 (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.704 (1967); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 80A.11 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-405 (Supp.
1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.304 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-205 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1107 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:14 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 49:3-61 (West 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-8 (1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 78A-27 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-08 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.09 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 304 (West
1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.065 (1983); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-206 (Purdon
Supp. 1984-1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-870 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 47-31-25.1 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-106 (Supp. 1983); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7(A) (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-10
(Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4208 (1970); VA. CODE § 13.1-510 (Supp.
1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.210 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 32-3-304 (1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 551.26 (1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-110 (1977).
233. See SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 3, pt. 2, § 7.01[1], at 7-11 to 7-16.
Section 304(b) of the Uniform Securities Act contains seventeen subsections that
list the information and documents which must accompany each application. The
categories are: (1) the issuer and any subsidiaries; (2) directors and officers; (3)
the aggregate remuneration of directors and officers; (4) ten percent stockholders;
(5) promoters; (6) sellers other than issuers; (7) capitalization; (8) securities offered,
price, and underwriting data; (9) use of proceeds; (10) options; (11) material contracts
and litigation; (12) sales literature; (13) specimen of security, articles of incorporation,
by-laws and trust indentures; (14) opinion of counsel; (15) statements of consent
by experts; (16) financial statements; and (17) other information required by the
administrator. Uniform Securities Act § 304(b)(1)-(17) (1958).
234. The § 106 preemptions are available to either mortgage related securities
or securities that are exempt from registration pursuant to § 4(5) of the Securities
Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5). The § 4(5) exemption is limited to
first mortgages on real estate and participation interests in mortgages
backed by whole loans originated by depository institutions that are
supervised and examined by Federal and State authorities, and mortgage
lenders approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) that sell only to such depository institutions, provided they are
sold in minimum amounts of $250,000 and payment is made within 60
days of the date of sale.
H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2827, 2830.
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be required to register using the coordination method set forth in
section 303 of the Uniform Securities Act.235 And those private
mortgage-backed securities that are exempt under section 4(5) should
be registered by qualification pursuant to section 304 of the Uniform
Securities Act.2 36 To accomplish this objective, the following amend-
ments should be enacted:
§ 303-a. Any securities which are mortgage related securities (as
that term is defined in section 3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c (a)(41)) and for which a registration
statement has been filed under the Securities Act of 1933 in con-
nection with the same offering may be registered by coordination.
This provision is specifically intended to replace section 106(c) of
the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act.
§ 304-a. Any securities that are offered and sold pursuant to
section 4(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 may be registered by
qualification. This provision is specifically intended to replace section
106(c) of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act.
For those securities that are registered by qualification, a list of
documents and information needed by the administrator to evaluate
the offering also should be made a part of the amendment. In
addition to the items already required under section 304(b) of the
Uniform Act, the list should include the following: detailed infor-
mation about the participants in the transaction, including the mort-
gage underwriters for the loans in the pool, the servicer, the escrow
agent, the issuer, and the insurer; and an explanation of the structure
of the offering including a description of the mortgages in the pool.237
VI1. Conclusion
Enhanced participation by the private sector is vital to the con-
tinued viability of the secondary market for home mortgages. Private
235. Uniform Securities Act § 303 (1958). See supra notes 231-32 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of registration by coordination under the Uniform
Securities Act.
236. Uniform Securities Act § 304 (1958). See supra notes 233-34 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of registration by qualification under the Uniform
Securities Act.
237. Section 304(b)(17) provides for "such additional information as the [ad-
ministrator] requires by rule or order." Uniform Securities Act § 304(b)(17) (1958).
Thus, each administrator is given the authority to promulgate rules requiring the
registrant to submit information not set forth in § 304(b)(1)-(16). Uniform Securities
Act (1958). Rather than amend the Act to provide for additional information, each
state may prefer to issue its own rules governing the type of information that
should be submitted by the registrant in connection with a PMBS offering.
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mortgage-backed securities are an attractive means of linking non-
traditional investors with the "capital hungry ' 238 mortgage market.
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act was designed to
eliminate some of the regulatory barriers which impeded the de-
velopment of a private mortgage-backed securities market. Section
106 of SMMEA preempted state legal investment laws and blue sky
laws affecting private mortgage-backed securities. In preempting these
state laws, Congress specifically reserved to the states the power to
override the section 106 preemptions within seven years from the
date of enactment of SMMEA. The override provisions in section
106 reflect Congress' belief that the blue sky laws and legal investment
laws serve a valid purpose but that the statutes need to be remodeled
in light of the private sector's participation in the secondary market
for home mortgages. An examination of the section 106 preemptions
in light of the policies and goals underlying the blue sky and state
legal investment laws indicates that the states should enact legislation
in both fields overriding the federal preemptions. Such legislation
is necessary to protect investors from fraud and highly speculative
securities and to preserve the financial welfare of state-chartered
investment institutions.
David J. Bleckner
238. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 25, § 2.02[7][d].
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